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Legislative and Judicial Confusion
Concerning Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy
I. Introduction
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code"),' represents
the first comprehensive change in United States bankruptcy law
since the 1938 revisions2 to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 3 ContempoI. II U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The drafting of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 (the "Code") began in 1970 with the formation of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States. See Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1971).
The Commission collected data for three years and filed a two-part report on July 30, 1973,
recommending changes and providing a complete draft of its proposals. See COMMISSION ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93rd Cong., IstSess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
The Commission's draft was introduced in the 93rd Congress as H.R. 10792 and S. 4026
along with H.R. 16673, a competing draft of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.
The bills were re-introduced in the 94th Congress as H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, and S. 236 and S.
235 respectively. In the 95th Congress, H.R. 6 was introduced, reflecting a concensus on most
of the issues. This consensus bill, however, was defeated on the House floor. H.R. 6 was then
revised and introduced as H.R. 8200 and S. 2266. As the session ended Congress enacted a
compromise bill with House Report No. 95-595 and Senate Report No. 95-989 in lieu of a
conference report. See generally 9 BANKR. SERV. L. ED. (LAWYER'S CO-OP.) §§ 81:1-90:100
(1979).
Most of the Code became effective on November 6, 1978. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
2. Chandler Act 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (repealed 1978). Surprisingly, Senator Don Edwards of the Bankruptcy Commission reported that the bankruptcy system was operating
somewhat effectively despite its age.
What the subcommittee has found in all of its work [the subcommittee held
35 days of hearings, heard from over 100 witnesses, and compiled a hearing
record of over 2,700 pages] is that the bankruptcy system is basically sound
.... This is all the more amazing, Mr. Speaker, when it is understood that the
bankruptcy system under which we are operating today was designed in 1898, in
the horse and buggy era of consumer and commercial credit, and was last overhauled in 1938, nearly 40 years ago. It has only been since 1938 that the consumer credit industry has grown, and it has only been since the widespread
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in the early 1960's that commercial
credit has grown to its present magnitude. In spite of the enormous new demands these two developments have placed on the bankruptcy system, the people
that operate the system have adapted and modernized within the existing framework to process a 20-fold increase in the number of bankruptcy cases, and an
even greater increase in the amount of assets passing through the bankruptcy
courts each year.
But, Mr. Speaker, this is not to say that the bankruptcy system and the
bankruptcy laws are not without their problems. The principal problem, of
course, is that the bankruptcy system has outgrown itself.
123 CONG. REC. E 19-20 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977), reprinted in 9 BANKR. SERV. L. ED. (LAWYER'S Co-oP.) § 81:1 (1979).
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rary changes in credit practices and in the bankruptcy caseload necessitated both substantive and administrative changes in the handling of bankruptcy cases." In addition, the Code's draftsmen sought
to plug pre-Code loopholes in order to protect the two fundamental

principles of bankruptcy law: giving the debtor a fresh start 5 and
treating all creditors equally.'

When a bankruptcy petition is filed, 7 the debtor in possession 8
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
4. The drafters of the 1938 Act could not have contemplated the processing in 1975 of
approximately 250,000 cases in which more than 700,000 creditors asserted claims for more
than 700 billion dollars in attempts to reach more than 500 billion dollars in assets.
The most significant administrative change mandated by the Code concerned status and
duties of bankruptcy judges. The Code provided for the elevation of bankruptcy judges to
Article III judges, entitling them to all of the powers and privileges of district court judges,
including tenure during good behavior and the full salary protections of constitutional judges.
The bill establishes constitutional courts for several reasons. First, the nature of
the work and the bankruptcy courts, its importance, and its volume justify the
same treatment for bankruptcy cases and litigants as other civil cases and litigants now receive in the district courts . . . . Second, the increased stature of
the bankruptcy courts will attract the highest caliber people to serve as judges.
123 CONG. REC. E 20 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977) reprinted in 9 BANKR. SERv. L. ED. (LAYWER'S
Co-op.) § 81:1 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Edwards). This declaration reflected the drafters'
recognition that the judges' tasks and powers required that they be removed from the day-today negotiations of the parties in order to avoid allegations of bias.
The way the Bankruptcy Act is set up, the administrative duties of the judge
cause the judge to identify himself with the debtor and his problem. The judge
who participates in negotiating contracts, who works with the debtor . . . and
who advises the trustee or debtor on an ex parte basis concerning management
of a business can hardly be expected to render an impartial decision.
L. KING, R. LEVIN & K. KLEE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, appendix 3, at IV-18 (15th ed.
1984).
Senator Drinan of the Commission discussed three loopholes the Code was designed to
close. The Code seeks to eliminate "reaffirmation," that is, a new promise to pay a particular
creditor a discharged debt. Drinan also expressed the draftsmen's intent to eliminate false
financing statements, by which creditors induce debtors to file financing statements listing only
their most important debts, allowing creditors to gain priority over some prior, unimportant
debts. Finally, the Code permits the debtor to take the federal exemptions. The Bankruptcy
Act limited debtor to his state's exemptions. Many of the states' exemption schedules were
inadequate. For example, Pennsylvania has not revised its exemptions since 1849. State exemption laws impaired the federal policy of giving debtors in bankruptcy a fresh start. 123
CONG. REC. H 11705 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977), reprinted in L. KING, R. LEVIN & K. KLEE,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, appendix 3, at IV-22 15th ed. (1984).
5. Senator Drinan noted, "first we want to give a fresh start to the debtor; in all the
writings on bankruptcy, this is the essence of bankruptcy. Let this poor individual discharge
his debts. Even since the mid-1800's, we do not put him in jail for debts he can not pay. Give
him a fresh start." 123 CONG. REC. H 11705 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977), reprinted in L. KING,
R. LEVIN & K. KLEE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, appendix 3, at IV-23 (15th ed. 1984).
6. Although neither the code nor its legislative history refers expressly to treating all
debtors the same as all creditors, the Code is purportedly neither pro-debtor nor pro-creditor.
That is to say that both debtors and creditors expect certain risks in the course of doing business, and the inherent inequality of the parties at the time of insolvency will be reflected in the
bankruptcy laws' allocation of those risks. Senator Drinan commented, "Mr. Chairman, I just
want to conclude by saying that this is a very balanced bill. There are some things that help
debtors in this bill, but as Chairman Edwards pointed out, there are many things for creditors
too. This bill is not pro-debtor nor pro-consumer." 123 CONG. REC. H 11704-11705 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1977), reprinted in L. KING, R. LEVIN & K. KLEE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, appendix 3, at VI-23 (15th ed. 1984).
7. Every case will be filed under a specific chapter of the Code. Chapter 7 concerns
liquidation cases; Chapter 9 concerns adjustments of debts of a municipality; Chapter II con-

or trustee9 is charged with management of the bankruptcy estate. 10
This includes disposition of executory contracts" that have become
cerns reorganization; and Chapter 13 deals with debt adjustment of individuals with regular
income. Only persons who qualify as debtors under Chapter 7 may seek relief under Chapter
I1.But see I I U.S.C. §§ 1161-1174 (1982) (specific railroad reorganization provisions under
Chapter II). Chapters I and 3 prescribe eligibility requirements for filing a petition under
chapters 7, 9, II and 13.
A debtor may "voluntarily" seek bankruptcy relief when he finds that his liabilities
greatly exceed his assets. Section 109(b) limits voluntary relief under chapter 7 to any person,
including a partnership or corporation, who resides, has a domicile, a place of business, or
property in the United States. Railroads, insurance companies, banks, savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, homestead associations, and credit unions are expressly excluded under the section. See also I I U.S.C. § 101(30) (1982) (definition of "person" for purposes of the Code).
On the date of filing, the debtor must have non-contigent, liquidated unsecured debts of
less than $100,000, and non-contigent, liquidated secured debts of less than $350,000. See II
U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982). The debtor files a voluntary petition under the appropriate chapter
pursuant to II U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
Conversely, a debtor may become a bankrupt if his creditors file an involuntary petition
pursuant to II U.S.C. § 303 (1982). Whereas the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 permitted involuntary relief only under Chapter 7, the Code extends this relief to Chapter 11. Under the Bankruptcy Act creditors filing an involuntary petition were required to prove debtor's commission
of one of six statutorily enumerated acts of bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
§ 3(a), 30 Stat. 544 (1898). Section 303(h) of the Code changes the creditor's burden to that
of proving debtor's current inability or failure to pay debts as they become due. See I I U.S.C.
§ 303(h) (1982).
8. In reorganization cases the Code, like the Act of 1898, allows the debtor to remain
"in possession" of the bankruptcy estate unless a party in interest requests that the court
appoint a disinterested trustee. The court appoints trustees from a panel selected by the Administrative Office of United States Courts to serve that particular court. To sustain his request the party in interest must also show: (1) that the debtor has been or is guilty of fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement or conduct of similar nature either before
or after the commencement of the case; or (2) that the appointment of a trustee is in the
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and any other parties interested in the estate.
9. Section 704 enumerates the duties of a trustee in Chapter 7 cases. The trustee
must,
(I) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee
serves, and close up such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best
interests of parties in interest;(2) be accountable for all property received;(3)
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;(4) if a purpose would be served,
examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper;(5) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;(6) unless the court
orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's
administration as is requested by a party in interest;(7) if the business of the
debtor is authorized to be operated, file with the court and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax
arising out of such operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of
such business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such
other information as the court requires; and(8) make a final report and file a
final account of the administration of the estate with the court.
II U.S.C. § 704 (1982). Although the court must select an interim trustee from the panel
assembled by the Director of the Administrative Office, 28 U.S.C. 604(0 (1982), the creditors,
in electing the trustee, are limited only by the minimum eligibility requirements set out in
Chapter 3 of the Code. See I I U.S.C. §§ 321, 702 (1982) (eligibility and election of trustee).
10. The commencement of a case by filing a petition in bankruptcy under section 301,
302, or 303 creates a bankruptcy estate. Section 541 broadly explains what property constitutes property of the estate. Generally, the estate contains all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property, wherever located, as of the commencement of the case. But see 11 U.S.C.
§§ 541(b), 541(c)(2) (1982) (listing exceptions).
1I. The draftsmen deliberately excluded a definition of "executory contract" from the
Code. "Its general meaning is well understood, and any succinct statutory language risks an

property of the estate. In order to give debtors a fresh start, the
Code expressly authorizes the trustee to reject burdensome executory
contracts12 and to assume and assign s valuable executory contracts
for the benefit of the estate's creditors. All of this is done under pro4
tection of an automatic stay.'

unintended omission or inclusion." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,at 198. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States and the bankruptcy courts seem to have
settled on Professor Vern Countryman's definition of executory contract. Countryman defines
an executory contract as "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). See also
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at § 602 (1973); Chattanooga Mem. Park v. Still, 574
F.2d 349, 352 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978) (definition of executory
contract consistent with Countryman); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Klinger, 563 F.2d 916, 917
(8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same).
A contract must be executory at the time of the filing in bankruptcy, but if only a small
phase of the contract is executory, the whole contract remains executory. See In re Universal
Medical Serv., Inc., 325]F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd 460 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972).
The trustee's option to assume or reject does not apply to non-executory contracts which
the non-bankrupt has fully performed. "The estate has whatever benefit it can obtain from the
other party's performance and the trustee's rejection would neither add to nor detract from the
creditor's claim or the estate's liability." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 451 (1973).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) provides:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
See also II U.S.C. § 1306 (1978).
13. After valid assumption of an executory contract or unexpired lease, the debtor in
possession may assign that contract for the benefit of the estate. Although section 365(a) does
not expressly allow assignment upon assumption, section 365(b)(3)(C) approves assignment:
For the purposes of paragraph (1)of this section, adequate assurance of
future performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center includes adequate assurance that assumption or assignment of such lease will not breach substantially any provision, such as radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision,
in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement relating to
such shopping center;...
II U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(C) (1982). Thus, assignment of executory contracts is made possible
without a specific provision of the Code permitting it.
14. Commencement of a case in bankruptcy under any of the applicable chapters automatically stays commencement or continuation of all judicial and non-judicial actions against
the debtor or its property. See II U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops
all collection efforts, all harrassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of
the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6296 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595]; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d.
Sess. at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5840 [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 989].
Specifically, Section 362(a) operates as a stay against:
(1) the commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding against the debtor;(2) the enforcement of a pre-petition judgment
against the debtor of his property;(3) any act to obtain possession of property;(4)
any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;(5)
any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the debtor to the

Conflicts arise, however, when the trustee's right to assume or
assign contracts clashes with the creditor's bargained-for right to terminate or otherwise prevent assignment of an executory contract.15
In the case of ipso facto16 or bankruptcy termination clauses, the
Code expressly pronounces that bankruptcy considerations will prevail. 7 The Code is silent, however, with respect to non-ipso facto
extent that the lien secures a pre-petition claim;(6) any act to collect, assess, or
recover a pre-petition debt against the debtor;(7) the set-off of any pre-petition
debts; and(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
15. Creditors, in attempting to avoid the burden of debtors' bankruptcy, bargain for the
right to terminate contracts. Debtors, on the other hand, fight to bring these valuable rights
into the estate and under the protection of the automatic stay. These assets benefit general
creditors in liquidation cases and weigh heavily in a court's decision whether to approve a
reorganization plan.
16. An ipso facto or bankruptcy clause either provides for automatic termination upon
bankruptcy or allows the creditor the option to terminate when the debtor becomes bankrupt,
insolvent, or files a petition in bankruptcy. See infra notes 55, 59 and 67 for examples of ipso
facto clauses.
17. Section 365(e)(1) expressly prohibits enforcement of ipso facto clauses:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in
applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not
be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or
lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement
of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on (A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before
the closing of the case;(B) the commencement of a case under this title;
or(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case
under this title or a custodian before such commencement.
II U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982). See also, section 541(c)(1)(B) (butresses section 365(e)(1) by
providing that the debtor's interest in property becomes property of the estate notwithstanding
such a provision).
Section 365(e)( I) invalidates ipso facto clauses in both Chapter 7 and Chapter II cases.
The Bankruptcy Commission had recommended that the provision be unenforceable in reorganizations but valid and enforceable in liquidations. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 198.
While 365(e)(1) appears to be pro-debtor, section 365(b)(1) and the accompanying legislative history attempt to strike a balance:
If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of
assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee (A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure such default;(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that
the trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to
such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease.
II U.S.C. § 365(b)(I) (1982). Although this section could be read as foreclosing termination
if the debtor cures his defaults, the legislative history evidences some Congressional sensitivity
to the creditor's position:
The unenforceability of ipsofacto clauses under 365(e) requires the courts to be
sensitive to the rights of the non-debtor party to executory contracts and
unexpired leases. If the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the courts have
to insure that the trustee's performance under the contract or lease gives the
other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6304; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5845.

termination provisions. 8 The silence has resulted in conflicting decisions concerning enforcement of these provisions.
This comment will examine the Code's treatment of the contractual right to terminate executory contracts. An examination of
bankruptcy case law governing contract termination will accompany
the statutory analysis. After addressing the pre-Code treatment of
termination clauses and the evolution of applicable statutory law, the
comment will focus on anomalies arising from courts' attempts to
resolve the termination issue absent pertinent statutory language. Finally, the comment will suggest to the practitioner contractual termination provisions designed to protect creditors.
II.

A History of Bankruptcy

Simpler societies did not concern themselves with creditors,
debtors and bankruptcy. In 1861, Sir Henry Main noted that
"[c]redit is an institution that lives by virtue of man's confidence in
his fellow man's good faith, and good faith and the primitive man
are strangers. '"19 The business dealings of Main's "primitive man"
did not involve promises for future performance. When credit transactions finally did emerge, 20 creditors had little reason to fear that
debtors would fail to perform their part of the contract. A creditor
could invoke either religion or self-help. In ancient India and Nepal,
for example, a creditor fasted at his debtor's door pending satisfaction of the debt, presuming that no debtor would allow his creditor
to starve to death.2 1 Ancient Hindu law allowed a creditor to seize
his debtor and force him to work off his debt. Alternatively, a crediconfine his wife, sons, or cattle, or
tor could maim or kill the debtor,
22
besiege him in his own home.
As the goal of bankruptcy proceedings evolved from retaliation
to compensation, creditors sought their remedies against the property
rather than the person of the debtor. Nevertheless, in light of these
early perceptions of defaulting debtors, the modern observer can understand more easily why the first bankruptcy statutes were quasicriminal. 2 Discharging the debtor was not a contemplated purpose
of the law.
American bankruptcy law is based on early English laws, known
18. For an example of a non-ipso facto termination clause, see infra note 134.
19. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 303 (1861).
20. See generally Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to
Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 583-588 (1969).
21. G. TARDE, EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURE IN PRIMITIVE LEGAL INSTITUTIONs 700
(n.d.).
22. The Code of Hammurabi protected the life and freedom of the honest debtor from
the self-help of creditors. See CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 116-117 (n.d.).
23. See infra note 26.

as the English Bankruptcy Acts.24 The first English Act, 25 enacted in
1542, addressed only fraudulent debtors, whom the Act treated as
criminals. 6 The courts permitted seizure and sale of a debtor's assets and distribution of the proceeds pro rata to creditors.2 7 Any accomplice of the bankrupt debtor was subject to fine or imprisonment.
Not surprisingly, the Act contained no provision for discharge of un28
paid debts.
The second English Act2 9 continued to treat the bankrupt as a
criminal. Still a creditor's remedy, the law contained no provision for
either voluntary bankruptcy or debtor's discharge from unpaid debts.
It confined bankruptcy proceedings to debtors who were merchants,
brokers, or traders. This limitation remained in English and American bankruptcy laws until the mid-nineteenth century.
Orientation of English bankruptcy law changed drastically at
the turn of the eighteenth century with the enactment of Queen
Anne's Act. 30 Bankruptcy law for the first time granted an honest
debtor a discharge from his unpaid debts and no longer viewed him
as a criminal.3 1 Nonetheless, although Queen Anne's Act shifted the
current of bankruptcy law in the debtor's favor, it did not allow voluntary bankruptcies.3 2 At this point in its development, bankruptcy
law appeared to serve three purposes: protection of creditors from
fraudulent debtors by permitting the sale of the debtor's assets; assurance of equality among creditors through pro rata distribution of
24. The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[wle take our bankruptcy system from England, and we naturally assume that the fundamental principles upon which it
was administered were adopted by us when we copied the system, somewhat as the established
construction of a law goes with the words where they are copied by another state." Sexton v.
Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1911). See generally, I H. RFMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1-IS (5th ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as H. REMINGTON]; The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223 (1917); W. COOK, A
COMPENDIOUS TREATISE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW (1778).

25. An Act Against Such Persons as do Make Bankrupts, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4.
26. The Act's preamble reflects its quasi-criminal treatment of debtors:
Where (as) divers and sundry persons craftily obtaining into their hands great
substance of other men's goods, do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their
houses, not minding to pay or restore to any (of) their creditors their debts and
duties, but at their own wills and pleasures consume the substance obtained, by
credit, of other men, for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason, equity and good conscience.
Id.
27. See I H. REMINGTON, supra note 24.
28. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
29. 13 Eliz., ch. IV (1570).
30. Queen Anne's Act, 1705, 4 Anne, ch. 17.
31. The act recited that,
And be it further enacted that all and every person and persons so becoming
bankrupt as aforesaid, who shall, within the time limited by this act, surrender
him, her or themselves - and in all things conform as in and by this act is
directed - shall be discharged from all debts by him, her or them due and
owing at the time that he, she or they did become bankrupt.
Id.
32. See supra note 11.

assets; and discharge of honest, law-abiding debtors in certain limited circumstances.

Early American bankruptcy laws did little more than codify existing rights between creditors and debtors. Yet they encountered the
kind of public resentment and distrust that plagued most federal legislation during the formative years of the Republic.33 Enacted in
1800, the first American bankruptcy act, like its English predecessor,34 tended to persecute financially delinquent merchants, brokers,
and traders. This act was repealed less than four years after its
enactment.
Congress passed a second bankruptcy act in 1841." 5 This law
applied to all living debtors, as opposed to only merchants, brokers
and traders, and allowed voluntary bankruptcies. The act also provided for reasonable seizure of debtors' property and for equitable

satisfaction of creditors. Furthermore, it discharged honest and cooperative debtors. Though clearly an improvement, the second act, like
the first, placed a heavy burden on litigants by forcing them to travel
often long distances to federal courthouses. More importantly, the
act fueled the controversy over states' rights. 36 It was repealed
within three years.
After a twenty-three-year lapse, Congress passed a third na-

tional bankruptcy act in 1867.1' Although it survived longer than

previous American bankruptcy acts,3 8 the act of 1867 was repealed
in 1878, largely because its provisions enabled creditors to force
debtors into bankruptcy too easily and made discharge too difficult. 39
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898,40 enacted twenty years later, attempted to remedy these defects by reducing the number of bankruptcies and challenges to discharge.4 1 This early attempt to balance
33. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Nonetheless, in the wake of other unpopular federal laws, such as the alien and sedition acts, citizens
viewed the first bankruptcy act as an attempt to eliminate states' rights. Creditors in particular
felt that journeys to distant federal courts to collect from local debtors were unduly
burdensome.
34. The predecessor referred to is the Second English Act. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. From 1803 to 1841, from 1844 to 1867 and from 1878 to 1898, no bankruptcy law
existed at the federal level. During these periods the states were free to legislate on the subject
of bankruptcies. But see Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (state bankruptcy law held to violate U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10).
36. See supra note 33.
37. See 9 H. REMINGTON, supra note 24.
38. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
39. See 9 H. REMINGTON, supra note 24.
40. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, pt. 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
41. By changing the definition of insolvency, the Act also reduced the number of debtors subject to involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. Previous acts had defined insolvency as the
inability to meet obligations as they mature. During economic panic almost all debtors fall
within this definition. The Act of 1898 defined an insolvent debtor as one whose assets, at fair
market value, are less than his liabilities. Id.

debtors' and creditors' rights characterized the eventual evolution of
bankruptcy law from a means of personal retaliation 42 to a non-pejorative system of administering insolvent estates. This evolution
culminated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
Early bankruptcy legislation, however, did not expressly provide
for termination of executory contracts by creditors. Under systems
which allowed neither voluntary bankruptcy nor discharge of unpaid
debts, or which allowed discharge only with the creditors' assent,
debtors obviously would have preferred enforcement of a creditor's
right to terminate over the other available pro-creditor remedies.43
The United States Supreme Court held in Kuehner v. Irving Trust
Co."' that a bankruptcy statute could impair, within limits,4 5 the
creditor's right to enforce terms of a contract. The Court noted that,
[t]he equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets, or the equitable adjustment of creditors' claims in respect of those assets,
by way of reorganization, may therefore be regulated by a bankruptcy law which impairs the obligation of the debtor's contracts. Indeed every bankruptcy act avowedly works such impairment. While, therefore, the Fifth Amendment forbids the
destruction of a contract it does not prohibit bankruptcy legislation affecting the creditor's remedy for its enforcement against
the debtor's assets."
The remainder of this comment will explore the boundaries of contract and bankruptcy law under the Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy
Code, and the case law.
III. Anomalies in Creditor's Termination Rights Under the Old
Bankruptcy Act
On its face, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not permit impairment of contracts as described in Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co. In
fact, the Act expressly allowed contracts to prevail in a direct confrontation with bankruptcy. Section 70(b), which addressed executory contracts, authorized ipso facto termination of unexpired
leases. 47 The section provided that:
A general covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be
42. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
43. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2574 (1979).
44. 299 U.S. 445 (1937).
45. See supra notes 19 and 22 and accompanying text.
46. Freedom of contract may be impaired as long as the subject legislation is consistent
with a fair, reasonable and equitable distribution of the debtor's assets. 299 U.S. at 452.
47. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 refers to executory contracts including unexpired
leases of real property. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(b), 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
The Code recfers to executory contracts and unexpired leases of real property. See I I U.S.C. §
365 (1982). The courts, however, have not considered the difference significant. Under both
the Act and the Code, unexpired leases of real property are treated as executory contracts.

assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at his election and subsequently assigning the
same; but an express convenant that an assignment by operation
of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either
party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an elec4
tion to terminate the same shall be enforceable.

This language allowed a creditor to protect himself from his debtor's
insolvency by simply bargaining for a term providing for contract
termination should the debtor file for bankruptcy relief.
Despite the Act's express provision allowing bankruptcy clauses,
some bankruptcy judges, reflecting a general judicial aversion to forfeiture, 49 struck these clauses either as impermissible penalties, 50 or
by applying theories of waiver 51 or estoppel. 52 In Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust,5" the United States Supreme Court held that a clause
which terminated a lease 54 upon lessee's bankruptcy and which entitled the lessor to recover rent for the balance of the term constituted
an unreasonable attempt to liquidate damages and was invalid as a
penalty. The Court disallowed termination not because of the ipso
facto clause, but because the stipulated damages were disproportionate to anticipated harm in the event of breach. Furthermore, the
payment contemplated would have come from the bankruptcy estate,
creating a preference for the lessor over other creditors and having
no incremental adverse effect on the debtor.5 5 Kothe reveals that
while ipso facto clauses are not objectionable standing alone, courts
will scrutinize additional verbiage in order to find violations of bank56
ruptcy principles.
Conversely, in Irving Trust v. A.W. Perry, Inc.,5 the United
48. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(b), 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (emphasis added).
49. See generally Waldman, The Demise of Automatic Termination, 54 OKLA. B.J.
(1983).
50. Agreements to pay fixed sums without reasonable relation to any probable damage
which may follow a breach will be unenforceable as a penalty. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust,
280 U.S. 224 (1930).
51. See infra notes 92 and 93 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
53. 280 U.S. 224 (1930).
54. The lease provided that,
The filing of any petition in bankruptcy . . . by or against the lessee shall be
deemed to constitute a breach of this lease, and thereupon, ipsofacto and without entry or other action by the lessor, this lease shall become and be terminated; and, notwithstanding any other provisions of this lease the lessor shall
forthwith upon such termination be entitled to recover damages for such breach
in an amount equal to the amount of the rent reserved in this lease for the
residue of the term hereof.
Id. at 225.
55. Had the contract called for liquidated damages in the amount of all rent due but
not yet paid, the damages clause and the termination clause most likely would have been
enforced. Id.
56. The Court struck the termination clause as well as the provision for damages.
57. 293 U.S. 307 (1934).

State Supreme Court enforced an ipso facto clause that contained
language fixing the lessor's damages at the difference between the
present value of the future rent and the present value of the fair
rental value of the premises for the balance of the term.58 The Court
viewed the liquidated damages clause as a separate express contract
and held that the clause provided a reasonable formula for ascertaining damages and did not, therefore, resemble a penalty.59 Irving
Trust demonstrates that explicit, unambiguous, and reasonable language can preserve a termination clause and fulfill the intent of the
parties.
The United States Supreme Court again addressed the problem
of forfeiture clauses in leases in Finn v. Meighan.60 The Court focused on the termination clause itself, rather than the validity of additional provisions. The debtor operated a restaurant on the leased
premises pursuant to a twenty-one year lease to expire in 1947. The
lease included the following forfeiture provision:
The tenant covenants that . . . if a petition in bankruptcy shall
be filed by the tenant or if the tenant shall be adjudged bankrupt or insolvent by any Court, or if a trustee in bankruptcy of
the tenant shall be appointed in any suit or proceeding brought
by or against the tenant, then and in each and every such case,
the term hereby granted shall immediately cease, determine and
come to an end, and the landlord may recover and resume possession of the demised premises by any legal means. 6'
When the lessee filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in 1943, the
lessor attempted to terminate the lease. The Court acknowledged a
distaste for forfeiture but bowed to Congress' expression of intent in
section 70(b). The Court noted that,
[t]he bankruptcy court does not look with favor upon forfeiture
clauses in leases. They are literally construed in favor of the
bankrupt lessee so as not to deprive the estate of property which
may turn out to be a valuable asset . . . . But an express covenant of forfeiture has long been held to be enforceable against
58. The lease provided that
for the more effectual securing to the lessor of the rent and other payments
herein provided, it is agreed as a further condition of this lease that the filing of
any petition in bankruptcy or insolvency by or against the lessee shall be deemed
to constitute a breach of this lease, and thereupon, ipsofacto and without entry
or other action by the lessor, this lease shall become and be terminated; and,
notwithstanding any other provisions of this lease, the lessor shall forthwith upon
such termination be entitled to recover damages for such breach in an amount
equal to the amount of the rent reserved in this lease for the residue of the term
hereof less the fair rental value of the premises for the residue of said term.
Id. at 309-10.
59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
60. 325 U.S. 300 (1945).
61. Id. at 301.

the bankruptcy trustee.6 2

Notwithstanding the judicial aversion to forfeiture, then, the Bankruptcy Act dictates that courts must enforce an express, bargainedfor right to terminate a lease in the event of the debtor's

insolvency.63
In In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.,64 a Michigan bankruptcy
court articulated a standard consistent with Finn v. Meighan. The
court conditioned enforceability of a section 70(b) termination clause
on the absence of ambiguity in the provision, noting that "forfeiture
provisions must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose
benefit they have been created," but only when "an ambiguity is
found to exist in the provision under scrutiny. '6 5 This language
clearly sets out a two-tier approach to ipso facto clauses in a real

property lease. First, an otherwise valid forfeiture clause that is not
ambiguous shall be enforced. Second, if the provision is ambiguous,
then the forfeiture clause may be enforced as long as enforcement
will not result in substantial injustice or prevention of reorganization.
In other words, the court may enforce an ambiguous clause; it must
enforce an unambiguous clause.
Although the Allied court enforced the termination clause,66 it
failed to follow the approach it adopted. The court found that the
clause was "clear and unambiguous" and therefore refused to give it
"the restrictive effect urged by Allied."16 7 The court went on, however, to distinguish the case at hand from In re Triangle Laborato62. Id. Accord Empress Theatre Co. v. Horton, 266 F. 657 (8th Cir. 1920); Jandrew v.
Bouche, 29 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1928).
63. The Court concluded: "Thus we must read § 70(b) as providing that an express
covenant is enforceable which allows the lessor to terminate the lease if a petition to reorganize
the lessee under Ch. X is approved . . . . That being the policy of Congress, our duty is to
enforce it." Finn, 325 U.S. at 303.
64. Environmental Properties Corporation v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 20 Bankr. 897
(E.D. Mich. S.D. 1982).
65. Allied, 20 Bankr. at 899 (quoting In re Dan Cohen Company, 221 F. Supp. 447
(S.D. Ohio 1963)).
66. Paragraph 25 of the lease provided:
Should Tenant make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or in the event of
the appointment of a Receiver for Tenant, which is not vacated within thirty
(30) days, Landlord may declare this Lease forfeited, and upon five (5) days
notice to Tenant, may immediately, or at any time thereafter, re-enter said
premises, without further notice.
In the event of the filing of any Petition in Bankruptcy by, or final adjudication of, such shall be deemed to constitute a breach of this Lease by Tenant, this
lease shall become and be terminated; and notwithstanding any other provisions
herein, Landlord shall forthwith upon such termination be entitled to recover
damages for such breach in an amount equal to the then present worth of the
rent reserved in this Lease for the residue of the term thereof, less the then
present worth of the then fair rental value of the premises for the residue of the
term.
id.
67. The court's determination that the provision was not ambiguous should have ended
the inquiry. An unambiguous termination clause shall be enforced. Id.
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ries,68 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reviewed cases denying enforcement of termination provisions when the debtor's estate would lose an asset essential to reorganization.6 9 The Allied court then determined the relative unimportance of the lease to Allied, noting that:
In the instant case, Allied is a debtor which maintains a number
of stores throughout the country. It has successfully emerged
from the bankruptcy proceedings and is now operating at a
profit. Many of the cases cited by Allied in support of its argument involved property which was either the single or most valuable asset of the debtor or property upon which the debtor had
made improvements to the land. In those cases, enforcement of a
forfeiture provision would have resulted in substantial injustice
or the prevent of reorganization. Such is not the case at bar
..

.

.Allied will continue to exist even after the lease involved

herein has been terminated. This court finds, therefore, that the
filing of the Chapter XI petition violated Paragraph 25 of the
lease which prohibits the filing of any petition in bankruptcy.
Further, this court is not convinced that the termination of this
lease would be inequitable by way of depriving the debtor
of its
70
most valuable asset or by thwarting its reorganization.
The court's use of the word "therefore" indicates that the court
based its decision to enforce the termination clause on Allied's financial resiliency, not on the lack of ambiguity in Allied's termination
clause.71 Whether the termination provision is sufficiently clear for
enforcement should not depend upon the importance of the contract
to the reorganization plan. The degree of clarity required for enforceability should not vary with the importance of the asset. Courts
should consider equity only after the contract has cleared the ambiguity hurdle.
72
Like the court in Allied, the court in Triangle Laboratories
purported to adopt Finn v. Meighan, but failed to follow it. Citing
Finn v. Meighan, the court held that "where the termination provisions of a lease are unambiguous and clearly expressed, they will be
68. Kopelman v. Halvajian, 663 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981).
69. The court considered Smith v. Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & S.S. Connecting Co.,
328 U.S. 123 (1946) (termination of railroad contract incompatible with public interest); In re
Fountainbleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975) (termination of lease would preclude
reorganization); and Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1974) (termination would deprive debtor of its most valuable asset).
70. Allied, 20 Bankr. at 898 (emphasis added).
71. If the facts in Allied were changed so that the lease were the debtor's only asset
and necessary to reorganization, then the court, in order to deny enforcement of the termination while remaining consistent with the rule adopted from In re Dan Cohen Co., 221 F. Supp.
447 (S.D. Ohio 1963), would be forced to determine that the provision was somehow ambiguous. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
72. Kopelman v. Halvajian, 663 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981).

given effect, unless doing so would contravene the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act."'78 Nothing in Finn, however, appears to support

the court's articulation of this equitable safety valve in favor of the
debtor.
Even if a court deems a termination provision clear enough for
enforcement,7 ' the court still may find that a lazy creditor has
waived the provision. In Geraghy v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp.,75 for
example, the creditor waited seven months after the debtor filed a

petition in bankruptcy before it attempted to terminate the debtor's
lease. The court held that the creditor had waived the right to terminate within a reasonable time. Thus, the use of waiver or estoppel

principles provides courts with another device to circumvent termination clauses.

Section 70(b)'s apparently unequivocal authorization of ipso
facto lease termination yielded diverse and discordant results when
considered in light of the traditional judicial aversion to forfeiture. A
creditor who wished to have his termination clause enforced had to

draft the clause in clear and unambiguous language. Furthermore,
the inclusion of an unreasonable liquidated damages clause could result in the destruction of the termination clause as well as the damages clause. Finally, the courts' interpretations of section 70(b) pun-

ished creditors who delayed in seeking enforcement of termination
provisions.
IV.

Code Treatment of Termination Clauses: Section 365(e)

A. Post-petition terminations.-Although the Code does not address and answer all possible questions concerning termination
clauses, 76 nor prevent application of waiver and estoppel to obliterate
these clauses 7 7 it effectively ends the dilemma of ipso facto termination clauses. Under section 365(e), ipso facto termination clauses

such as those considered in Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, Irving Trust
73. Id. at 468.
74. One commentator attempted to clarify the distinction in the Act of 1898 between a
general covenant and an express covenant in a lease:
The practical upshot of this distinction is a restatement and clarification of the
warning to draftsmen that has for many decades been deduced from caselaw and
which may thus be formulated: The law does not inquire what the parties actually meant and intended by a forfeiture clause in connection with the assignment
of a lease; it requires a kind of sacred and inflexible formula, much in the manner of the stricti juris formulae of preclassical Roman law. It is not enough to
say that a lease shall terminate or may be terminated if assigned to anyone that is to "general." It must be said that the lease shall terminate upon the
bankruptcy of the lessee (or the lessor or both) - that is "express" enough.
J. MOORE, R. OGLEBAY, F. KENNEDY & L. KING, 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, %70.44[3] (14th
ed. 1978).
75. 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954).
76. See supra note 15.
77. See supra notes 73 and 74 and accompanying text.
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Co. v. A. W. Perry, Inc., and In re Allied Supermarkets are stricken
by operation of law without further consideration.
1. Ambiguity in § 365(e)(1)
78
In addition to the Code's failure to define executory contract
and its more serious failure to address non-ipso facto termination
provisions,79 section 365(e)(1) itself presents substantial problems of
statutory construction. The section prohibits post-petition terminations that depend "solely" upon ipso facto clauses for their validity.
This language suggests that the Code's draftsmen intended to allow
automatic termination if other factors outside the termination provision are present. While no courts have upheld a creditor's right to
enforce such clauses, courts have construed whether section
365(e)(1) allows post-petition termination on grounds other than insolvency. In Seacoast Products, Inc. v. Spring Valley Farms, Inc.,80
a creditor sought to prohibit assumption of an executory contract,
arguing that section 365(e)(1) tacitly approves post-petition termination of contracts based on factors other than bankruptcy. The United
States District Court for North Carolina rejected the argument, noting that:

Section 365(e)(1) was enacted as remedial legislation to stop
forfeitures of contractual rights pursuant to such clauses as was
allowed

under the prior

Bankruptcy

Act . .

.

. Section

365(e)(1) is not authority for the proposition that Seacoast can
terminate its contract with Spring Valley because of the latter's
curable default. One of the central purposes of section 365 is to
provide debtors with a mechanism to preserve executory contracts despite their defaults.8 l
78.
79.
80.
81.
365(b)(1)

See supra note 11.
See infra notes 111-158 and accompanying text.
34 Bankr. 379 (M.D. N.C. 1983).
Id. at 381. The mechanism to which this court referred lies in 11 U.S.C. §
(1982), which provides:
If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time
of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee (A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly cure such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract
or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such
default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such
contract or lease.
The court confined the creditor's remedy to the four corners of this section. "This provision
appears to grant the trustee the power to avoid the non-debtor's right under state law to terminate the contract provided the contract is executory at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed
and the trustee can adequately cure the default." Seacoast, 34 Bankr. at 382. This court so
concluded despite the creditor's reliance on Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products Corp., 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the court found that "trustee's decision to
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Thus, the court based its finding on the purported purpose rather
than the literal language of the section.
In re Nashville White Trucks82 presents a different view of section 365(e)(1). In that case, the debtor, contrary to express conditions in its contract with the creditor, made lease payments late,
failed to submit required financial statements, did not meet working
capital requirements, and did not carry an adequate inventory. 3 The
Tennessee bankruptcy court upheld the creditor's subsequent termination of the contract, reasoning that bankruptcy was not the cause
of termination: "Numerous other factors existed and bankruptcy
simply added to the stack. At most it was the event that triggered a
final decision." ' 84 The court, however, failed to explain whether its
holding depended upon the bankruptcy in addition to the "numerous
other factors," or upon the other factors alone.
2. Pre-petition terminations.-Section 365(e)(1)'s applicability after the commencement of a case in bankruptcy permits the inference that a creditor may exercise a contractual right to terminate
before the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, even if that termination stems solely from the debtor's insolvency or imminent filing of a
petition in bankruptcy. The Florida bankruptcy court reached this
conclusion in In re L.J.P., Inc.8 Pursuant to the terms of a license
agreement, 6 the creditor informed the debtor on June 1 that the
license agreement had terminated automatically because of the
debtor's insolvency. The debtor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on June 30 and sought to invalidate the termination under
section 365(e). Faced with a pre-petition termination based solely on
insolvency, the court concluded:
adopt . . . a contract following the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not preclude the exercise of the other party's pre-existing right to terminate the agreement." Schokbeton, 466 F.2d
at 175. The court in Seacoast considered this rule inapplicable because the Bankruptcy Act,
under which the case had been decided, did not contain a provision for curing defaults. It is
unclear, however, whether the court decided the case on the basis of waiver, because Seacoast
never attempted to terminate upon prepetition defaults, or on a determination that failure to
terminate for pre-petition defaults was evidence that the creditor has based termination solely
on the debtor's filing in bankruptcy.
82. White Motor Corporation v. Nashville White Trucks, Inc., 5 Bankr. 112 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980).
83. Id. at 114.

84. Id. at 117.
L.J.P., Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Company, 22 Bankr. 556 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
Section 7.1(4) of the Bottler's Agreement of January 2, 1982 read as follows:
Termination Without NoticeThis agreement and any and all rights of Licensee hereunder and any and all obligations of RCC hereunder shall immedi-

85.
86.

ately terminate, without the requirement of any notice of Licensee, upon the
occurrence of any of the following: . . . (4) The insolvency of Licensee;
Id. at 557 n. 106. See generally Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part 1, 58
MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974) (discussion of, inter alia, license agreements as executory
contracts).

[t]here is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code which prohibits
the termination before bankruptcy of a contract on account of
insolvency. Section 365(e)(1) expressly prohibits the termination
or modification of any contract "at any time after the commencement of the case" solely on account of insolvency. That
subsection also prohibits termination or modification of any contract solely because of the commencement of a bankruptcy case.
The express provisions of that subsection convince me that there
is no legislative intent to invalidate the pre-petition termination
of a contract on the sole ground of insolvency.Similarly, there is
no provision of the Code which permits assumption or the curing
87
of defaults in a contract terminated before bankruptcy.
The court held that as long as the pre-petition termination is lawful,
the motivation behind it is irrelevant. Thus, before the debtor files in
bankruptcy, a contract that terminates automatically and without
the requirement of notice leaves the debtor wholly outside the protections of the Bankruptcy Code, and the contract prevails.
2. Applicability of Section 105(a) to Non-Ipso Facto Termination Clauses
Bargained-for non-ipso facto termination clauses"8 do not fit
neatly into section 365(e)(1). Thus, because section 365(e)(1) does
not automatically avoid attempts at this type of termination, some
courts have relied on the broad equitable power granted by section
105(a) 89 in order to avoid the termination. In In re Amber Lingerie,
Inc.,9° the United States Bankruptcy Court for New York held that
under 105(a), a court "has the inherent equitable power in proper
circumstances, to enjoin cancellation of a contract in order to preserve the continuation of the debtor's business."9 A recent case concerning equitable enjoining of non-ipso facto terminations explained
the proper circumstances for the use of section 105. In In re Prime
Computer,92 the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee held that a court can apply section 105 to avoid termination of contracts "where such relief is indispensable to reorganization and necessary to prevent retaliation for exercising rights under
87. L.J.P., 22 Bankr. at 558.
88. For example: "either party may terminate this contract upon thirty days written
notice." Because the termination is not conditioned on bankruptcy, section 365(e)(1) does not
apply.
89. II U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) provides:
The bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
90. 30 Bankr. 736 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
91. Id. at 737.
92. Advisory Information and Management Systems, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,
No. 3-83-0972, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. June 20, 1984).
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Chapter 11, and where the relief imposes no substantial burden or
hardship on those in contractual relations with a debtor."9' The
court stressed that section 105 does not allow courts to enlarge the
contractual rights of the debtor. Therefore, if the creditor's attempt
to terminate is motivated by factors other than the debtor's insolvency, courts should not enjoin termination, even if allowing termination precludes reorganization, unless the termination is in retaliation for bankruptcy. Section 105, then, merely reinforces section
365(e)(1) by allowing courts to enjoin termination based on bankruptcy when the contract does not specify bankruptcy as grounds for
termination."
V. Bargained-for Non-Ipso Facto Termination Clauses: Clash Between Contract Law and Bankruptcy Law
Faced with a non-ipso facto termination clause, a court must
decide whether to enforce the agreement and honor the expectation
of the parties or to assert general principles of bankruptcy law. In
light of the case law and various expressions of Congressional intent,
the contract should prevail and the court should allow non-ipso facto
termination.
A.

Post-Petition Termination at Option upon Pre-PetitionNotice

In In re Anne Cara Oil Co. Inc.,9" the parties had executed a
lease and separate franchise agreement which gave the creditor the
option to terminate, upon notice to the debtor, for any one of several
specified reasons. 96 On January 12 and March 15, the creditor gave
the debtor notice of termination effective April 15, citing two of the
specified reasons in support. On April 14 the debtor filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. The court reasoned that on April 14 the automatic stay caused by the filing prevented the creditor from retaking the leasehold premises or cancelling the franchise agreement.
Nevertheless, when the agreements terminated on April 15, upon the
expiration of the notice, they ceased to be property of the estate and
therefore were no longer protected by the automatic stay. 97 The
court noted that a stay created under section 362 "does not operate
93. Id. at _.
94. For example, the creditor attempts to terminate pursuant to a clause that provides
for termination upon notice. If the court finds that the termination is based on bankruptcy, it
will not enforce the clause, even though bankruptcy was not mentioned in the contract.
95. Shell Oil Company v. Anne Cara Oil Co., Inc., 32 Bankr. 643 (Mass. 1983).
96. The actual termination provision was not reported in the opinion.
97. The court noted that an automatic stay "would offer no protection to the debtor as
it is well settled that the bankruptcy court cannot create an interest for the debtor where none
exists." Anne Cara, 32 Bankr. at 647 (quoting L.J.P., 22 Bankr. at 558). In other words,
bankruptcy law would not have applied, and the provisions of the contract would have controlled absolutely.

to toll the mere running of time."" Thus, notice given prior to the
commencement of a bankruptcy case can run its course unaffected
by the stay. Relying in part on In Re Nashville White Trucks,99 the
court concluded that the Code contains nothing "which enlarges the
rights of the debtor under the contract or which prevents the termination of the contract on its own terms." 10 0 The courts in Anne Cara
and Nashville White Trucks viewed valid expiration or termination
dates in executory contracts as limitations on the debtor's right to
assume and assign in the event of bankruptcy. 10 1
The facts in Nashville White Trucks were similar to those in
Anne Cara. The debtor leased premises and executed a franchise
agreement with the creditor.' 0 ' The debtor filed a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy on January 10, and the franchise agreement was to
terminate without notice by its own terms on January 29. In holding
that the creditor was relieved from the automatic stay, the court
noted that "lilt is a fundamental concept that the assumed contract
or lease is accompanied by all its provisions and conditions. Thus, a
contract may be assumed subject to all its limitations, one of which
is obviously the expiration date."' 0 A contrary result would have
strangled business relations. Creditors would terminate their contracts at the first sign of a debtor's financial weakness, or they would
contract for shorter notice periods to prevent debtors from filing in
bankruptcy during the interval between the receipt of notice and the
effective date of termination.
Courts have given a similar treatment to license agreements
under which debtors have filed petitions in bankruptcy after notice of
termination but before the effective date of termination. In In re
Beck °4 the debtor entered into license agreements authorizing the
debtor to operate beauty salons in two of the creditor's department
stores. The license agreements contained non-ipso facto termination
clauses.' 0 5 Because of irregularities in debtor's accounting proce98. Anne Cara, 32 Bankr. at 647 (quoting In re Barker-Greene Co., 17 Bankr. 248,
250 (D. Minn. 1982)).
99. The court also relied on Thompson v. Texas Mexican Railway Co., 328 U.S. 134
(1946).
100. Anne Cara, 32 Bankr. at 647 (quoting Nashville White Trucks, 5 Bankr. at 117).

101. It should be noted, however, that under the Code at the time of these cases (prior
to August, 1984) the debtor could have assumed and assigned its rights under the contracts for
the one day during which the contracts were property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)
(1984).
102. The text of the franchise agreement was not reported in the opinion.
103. Nashville White Trucks, 5 Bankr. at 116. Debtor could have assigned its rights
under the contract from January 10 to January 29. See infra note 129.
104. 5 Bankr. 169 (D. Hawaii 1980).
105. Paragraph 17 of each license agreement provided as follows:
This agreement shall continue in effect until terminated by either party hereto
by giving at least 60 days prior written notice of the effective date of such termination to the other party.

dures, the creditor notified the debtor on March 28 that, pursuant to
the license agreements, the contracts would terminate on June 14.
Beck filed a petition in bankruptcy on May 16 and sought to enjoin
the creditor's attempts to terminate the agreements. Citing Thomp0 Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v.
son v. Texas Mexican Railway Co., 1°
Benavides"1 I and Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products Corp.,' °8 the Hawaii bankruptcy court concluded that "the filing of the petition for relief with the Bankruptcy Court in no way
gives rise to a right in the Trustee as Debtor in possession to extend
the time of the License Agreements."' 0 9 In response to the debtor's
contention that its rights in the license agreements should fall under
the protection of the automatic stay, the court reasoned that the automatic stay provision "only protects a debtor's property interests,
and at best any property interest of the debtor under the License
Agreements expired as of June 14, 1980. "110 Accordingly, execution
of a contract containing a provision for non-ipso facto termination
upon notice begins a race. If the creditor serves notice of termination
before the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, the creditor wins.
A New York bankruptcy court relied on Beck in In re Benrus
Watch Co., Inc."' The court held that the debtor's April 24 filing
for relief under Chapter 11 did not prevent the subsequent termination of the parties' license agreement when the creditor had given
notice of termination on March 16.112 The court's reasoning reveals
that, in effect, the parties had written their own section 365 into
their contract and the creditor had complied with it." 5 In evaluating
the termination clause, the court noted that:
In general, the terms of a contract should be construed according to their plain and unambiguous meaning . . . Paragraph
13(a) clearly states the procedure for terminating the agreement
Id. at 170.
106. 328 U.S. 134 (1946).
107. 602 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
108. 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972).
109. 5 Bankr. 169, 170-71 (D. Hawaii 1980).
110. Id. at 171. See also Thompson v. Texas Mexican Railway Co., 328 U.S. 134, 141
(1946), the Court noted that the trustee "takes the contracts of the debtor subject to all their
terms and conditions. Contracts adopted by him are assumed cum onore."
I1.
13 Bankr. 331 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).

112. Debtor challenged the sufficiency of the notice because the letter came from creditor's attorney rather than from creditor. The court dismissed the argument, noting that, "Most
frequently it should be counsel who appraises the facts given by his client, who applies those
facts to the words the parties wrote in their agreement, and who can determine from the
instrument whether the requisite events have occurred." Id. at 334.
113. Paragraph 13(a) of the agreement provided:
If licensee shall violate any of the obligations under the license agreement, licensor shall have the right to terminate the license hereby granted by giving notice
of such termination of licensee, unless such breach is cured by licensee within 30
days after receiving written notice of such breach from licensor.
Id. at 333 n.2.

in the event of a breach by the licensee . .

. It is plain from

the undisputed facts here that the notice was given in conformity with the termination provision and that the default in royalty
payments constituted a114breach within the terms of the contract
to support termination.
After the court adopted the rule of Beck, it assessed the validity of
the termination agreement and the creditor's compliance therewith
and upheld the termination.
Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products Corp.'"1 6
demonstrates most clearly that pre-petition notice of termination,'
which leaves only the passage of time until actual termination, will
not fail because of an intervening filing in bankruptcy. The creditor
gave notice on November 13 of termination effective January 16 due
to default in payment of the royalties upon which the parties had
conditioned their license agreement. The debtor filed for relief under
Chapter XI on December 8. The court pointed out that even though
the rehabilitation plan would necessarily fail without the license
agreement" 7 the termination was enforceable. The court also noted
that "[i]n order to obtain the benefits of an assumed contract, the
trustee must accept the burdens of the contract as they existed when
the contract was in the hands of the bankrupt.""' 8 The debtor's failure to pay royalties justified termination under ordinary principles of
contract law. 1 9
In Re Trigg'2 0 explains the reasoning behind the cases which
hold that a party may terminate a contract under ordinary principles
of contact law even if the defaulting party has filed a petition in
bankruptcy. The Trigg court noted that:
What 70(b) actually proposes to do is precisely to secure the
continued mutuality wherever it is felt to be of greater benefit to
the estate to proceed in accordance with the bankrupt debtor's
plans rather than to freeze his commercial relations as of the
filing date. The price for securing the potential margin of benefit
114. Id. at 333, 334.
115. 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1971).
116. Paragraph 17 of the license agreement provided that "any default by licensee remaining uncured for 60 days after receipt of written notice from the licensor would justify
termination by the licensor." Id. at 173 n.2.
117. The license agreement was the debtor's primary asset. It alone made the capital
stock worth acquiring.
118. Schokbeton, 466 F.2d at 185.
119. Professor Countryman notes that Schokbeton seems erroneous to the extent that it
gave effect to an automatic termination clause. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 11, 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 505 (1973). The termination clause in Schokbeton,
however, did not provide for automatic termination. See Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides, 602 F.2d 998 (Ist Cir. 1979). In any event, the court in New Media Irjax v. D.C.
Comics, 19 Bankr. 199 (M.D. Fla. 1982) concluded that the Code would not require a different result in Schokbeton.
120. 630 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1980).

1049

to the estate is high. It is nothing short of complete mutuality,
that is assumption by the estate of the bankrupt's liabilities, not
as a matter of granting a distributive phase, but by performance
in full, just as if bankruptcy had not intervened.""1
This reasoning seems analogous to the curing provisions of section
365(a)122 and the legislative history of the section 365(e)(1) require-

ment that courts assure non-bankrupt parties the full benefit of their
bargains. 23
In re New Media Irjax, Inc.1 2' applied the principles used in
lease and license agreement cases to an executory contract for the

sale of goods. On September 11 the debtor agreed to buy and the
creditor agreed to sell comic books. On January 14 the creditor notified the debtor of termination effective January 20, pursuant to the
termination provision of the sales agreement.1 25 After filing a petition for relief under Chapter 11 on January 19, the debtor argued
that the contract was executory at the time of filing and therefore
sought to assume it subject to the requirements of section 365.l2

The court, however, held that the agreement "was properly terminated by the notice of termination, . . . and there remained nothing
to be done under the contract except the running of time.

'1 27

Thus, a

contract that will terminate by its own terms on a date certain subject only to the mere running of time is unaffected by bankruptcy
12 8

law.

B. The Equitable Estoppel Exception
Courts will not enforce the termination of an executory contract, even by its own terms, when the debtor can successfully assert
equitable estoppel. In In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corpora121. Id. at 1375 (quoting J. MOORE, R. OGLEBAY, F. KENNEDY & L. KING, 4A COLLIER
70:43[2] (14th ed. 1978)).
ON BANKRUPTCY
122. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 17.
124. In re New Media Irjax, Inc., 19 Bankr. 199 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
125. Article VIIi of the agreement provided:
This agreement may be terminated by either party upon 30 days prior written
notice by mail to the other party. Without limiting the foregoing, D.C. shall
have the right to terminate the agreement on 5 days written notice following
either: (i) any four failures by Customer within any two month period to make
timely payment of any amounts due to D.C. hereunder; or (ii) any failure to pay
D.C. any amount due to D.C. within 30 days of the date such payment was due.
Provided, however, that Customer shall remain liable for all obligations incurred
by it to D.C. hereunder prior to the date of termination.
Id. at 200.
126. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
127. New Media, 19 Bankr. at 200.
128. In other words, as of the date of termination, the contract is no longer property of
the estate protected from creditors by the automatic stay. See supra notes 10 and 14 and
accompanying text.
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tion," 9 the debtor waited to file for relief under Chapter 11 in reliance on the creditor's promise that it would not send notice of termination regarding the parties' distributorship agreement until the
parties had met to discuss a payment plan. When the creditor attempted to terminate the agreement prior to the meeting, the creditor was estopped from claiming pre-petition notice of termination.
Notwithstanding the creditor's "unclean hands",130 the court, in conformity with Section 365(a), 81 required the debtor to cure its default and provide
adequate assurances of future performance.
The equitable estoppel exception places a heavy burden of proof
on the debtor. In In re New Media Irjax, Inc., the debtor, relying on
In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corporation, raised estoppel against
the creditor's attempted termination of the contract. The creditor
had continued to transact business with the debtor on a week-toweek cash basis after the debtor's defaults. The court concluded
that:
There is nothing in the case of In re Bronx which supports the
debtor's contention that [creditor] is estopped to urge cancellation. There is nothing in this record which supports the proposition that [creditor] ever made any promises or did anything affirmatively, reliance on which the debtor changes its position to
its detriment. Specifically, this Court is satisfied from the totality of the evidence that although [creditor] made interim weekto-week cash shipments, such shipments were allowed under the
contract [though not expressly] and [creditor] made no agreements or gave any assurances that it would not terminate the
agreement before a date certain and made no arrangements or
assurances to continue to ship comic books for any length of
13
time whatsoever. 2
The court did not permit the debtor to rely on the week-to-week cash
shipments, even though the debtor would probably have filed for relief sooner if it had no supplier of comic books.
C. Post-Petition Termination at Option
In re Douglas3 3s is an insurance case in which both the formation of the contract and the attempted termination occurred after the
129. 4 Bankr. 730 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
130. One who has "unclean hands" is not entitled to relief in equity. This ancient doctrine means no more than that one who has defrauded his adversary in the subject matter of
the action will not be heard to assert his right in equity. It has no application unless the party's
wrongdoing has some proximate relation to the subject matter in controversy. See BLACKS
LAW DICTIONARY 1367 (5th ed. 1979).
131.
132.
133.

See supra note 8l.
New Media, 19 Bankr. at 201.
18 Bankr. 813 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).

debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11. The debtor, hav-

ing filed the petition for relief, sought insurance coverage for the
property of the bankruptcy estate during the administration of the
estate. An agent of the insurance company's4 provided the debtor
with- coverage in excess of one million dollars. The insurer, unaware
of the debtor's prior filing, traditionally refused to insure petitioners
seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Upon learning of debtor's
status the insurer attempted to terminate' 35 the policy, which would
lave expired on December 14, 1984, by serving notice of termination

on January 29, 1982. The court considered whether it should allow
the insurer to invoke the cancellation provision of the policy notwithstanding the insurer's "obvious discriminatory treatment against peThus, the
titioners under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."''
issue centered on the clash between contract law and bankruptcy
law. The insurer admitted that its discovery of the filing was the
prime reason for cancellation. The court noted that cancellation was

not only clearly discriminatory against debtor, but also that enjoining cancellation would not subject the insurer to additional risk.
Nevertheless, the court upheld cancellation, noting that section
525'13 of the Code does not prevent private parties from discriminat-

ing against bankrupt debtors. The court explained its decision in
terms of bargained-for exchange:
Cancellation under the policy is equally available to the DIP
[debtor in possession] - i.e. if the DIP had found insurance at
a lesser price, the DIP could also cancel the policy at any time
prior to the contractual expiration of the policy. This is not to
say, however, that damages may or may not be assessed against
134. Whether the agent had knowledge of debtor's prior filing for relief remained in
dispute. Id. at 815.
135. The termination provision read as follows:
This policy shall be cancelled at any time at the request of the insured (DIP)
[debtor in possession in the event of bankruptcy] . . . .This policy may be cancelled at any time by the Company (Glens Falls) by giving to the insured a five
days' written notice of cancellation.
Id. at 814 (emphasis added by the court).
136. Douglas, 18 Bankr. at 813, 814.
137. II U.S.C. § 525 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a
grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to,
terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment
against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt
or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has
been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act,
has been insolvent before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not
paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
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the parties for any early cancellation of the policy. 13 a
The court also held that injunctive relief pursuant to the general equity powers of section 105(a) 13 9 was inappropriate because the
debtor could obtain insurance elsewhere, although possibly at a
higher price. The court recognized that the termination clause was a
material term that had resulted from pre-contractual negotiations.
Based on these contract principles, the court enforced the termination clause.
Arguably, Douglas is distinguishable from most termination
cases because the contract was formed post-petition. Accordingly,
the decision to terminate was based not on the insured's subsequent
filing for relief, but on the insured's status as a bankrupt throughout
the life of the contract. The Douglas court did not indicate whether
it would uphold the post-petition termination of a contract formed
pre-petition.
Unlike Douglas, the court in In re Amber Lingerie, Inc.140 did
not defer to the insurance contract in a dispute concerning post-petition termination. The debtor, who customarily dealt with the insurer,
obtained a one-year multi-peril insurance policy effective July 12."'1
On October 18, debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11.
The issuer notified debtor on December 9 that the insurance policies
would terminate on January 11. Debtor did not allege that cancellation was based on the filing in bankruptcy. Rather than give effect to
the bargained-for termination clause, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for New York relied on its broad equitable power 4" to enjoin
cancellation, The court justified invocation of this power by noting
that increased insurance costs effectively rendered replacement coverage unavailable." The court added that forcing the debtor to continue in business without insurance would jeopardize reorganization.
The insurer claimed that enjoining cancellation would result in inequity, because it would not receive compensation for increased risks.
The parties had intended the termination clause to protect against
such contingencies as the debtor's bankruptcy. The court rejected
this argument, reasoning that the insurer had previously allowed for
an increased risk due to the lack of sprinkler systems in the debtor's
building by assessing a $198 surcharge to the policy. In short, the
court appears to have penalized the insurer simply because the insur138. Douglas, 18 Bankr. at 815 (court's footnote 1).
139. See supra notes 86 to 92 and accompanying text.
140. 30 Bankr. 736 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
141. The policy provided for cancellation by mailing of thirty days' written notice to the
insured. Id. at 736.
142. See supra notes 88 to 94 and accompanying text.
143. On the other hand, the Douglas court held injunctive relief inappropriate if alternative insurance is available, regardless of its price. See Douglas, 18 Bankr. at 815.

ance policy proved necessary to reorganization. 1" The Amber Lingerie holding in effect makes all other creditors third party beneficiaries of the insurance contract. These creditors can disregard the
termination clause and rest assured that the debtor will survive disaster regardless of its inability to pay for insurance. Thus, an insurer's bargained-for right to terminate depends upon the ability of
his bankrupt debtor to obtain other insurance. As a result, insurers
might resort to writing policies for shorter terms, perhaps by the
month, which would increase drastically the administrative costs of
their services.
Amber also permits the inference that under proper circumstances a creditor can terminate a contract upon post-petition notice.
The court noted that the debtor did not allege bankruptcy as the
reason for termination. Therefore, the termination did not violate
section 365(e)(1)."1 5 The injunction was granted only because termination would have thwarted reorganization. Thus, in a case in which
the debtor does not allege bankruptcy as the reason for termination,
or in which the creditor can prove that bankruptcy did not motivate
him to exercise his right to terminate, and where termination will
not threaten reorganization, perhaps the Amber Lingerie court would
allow termination upon post-petition notice.
D. Termination of Contract by its Own Terms Under Ordinary
Principles of Contract Law
The courts have created an anomaly by allowing termination of
executory contracts in accordance with their own terms when the
contract contain fixed termination dates, but not allowing termination in accordance with other contractual terms, such as optional termination-upon-notice provisions. Non-ipso facto termination clauses,
such as expiration dates in leases or licensing agreements are terms
of the contract. The parties have bargained for them, and courts
therefore should give them effect." 6 By striking the clauses, courts
fail to consider pre-contractual negotiations during which the creditor may have conceded other material terms in order to gain the
debtor's assent to the termination clause. Thus, the creditor not only
loses a term for which he bargained, but also remains bound by a
144. The court noted:
"Effectively there is no replacement coverage available. The debtor cannot afford the cheapest alternative, which is several times more expensive than the
present policy. If the debtor were to continue in business without insurance coverage, it would be subject to such a great risk of loss that its reorganization
would be jeopardized."
Amber Lingerie, 30 Bankr. at 737.
145. See supra note 17.

146. See Vogel v. Tenneco Oil Company, 465 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

term he would not have accepted but for the inclusion of the termination clause. This result could not run more contrary to the Congressional desire that courts assure the nonbankrupt party the full
benefit of his bargain when the debtor assumes an executory
47
contract.
The only difference between termination on a date certain and
option to terminate upon notice is degree of definiteness. 1 8 Both
terms, however, are sufficiently definite to allow enforcement. 4 9 A
debtor should be as aware of the possibility that his creditor could
terminate their agreement at any time upon notice as he would be
that his contract expires on a particular date. Nonetheless, the court
in In re R.O.A.M., Inc. 5 0 found this difference significant. The creditor had bonded the debtor to the state of Nevada for premiums on
employee accident and health claims and Nevada taxes. The bonds
provided that the creditor could cancel on thirty days notice. In response to creditor's attempt to terminate, the court noted that:
These bonds do not provide for expiration. They are continuous
obligations except if cancelled by the surety upon 30 days notice. In that respect they are unlike a bond or policy which by its
terms expires on a date certain. Such latter bonds may not be
extended beyond the original terms . . . . Absent a showing
that Aetna will be further harmed and because there is no expiration date, there is no reason to permit cancellation at this
time.' 6 '
Although the contract did not expire on a date certain, it expires by its own terms on a certain date thirty days following notice.
Courts have traditionally allowed termination when only the mere
passage of time1 5 2 stands in the way of termination. There is no significant difference between the mere passage of time and the mere
exercising of a contractual right to terminate. When the creditor exercises his bargained-for, pre-existing right to terminate, the contract
actually expires by its own terms under ordinary principles of contract law.
147. See supra note 17.
148. In French law, a deed is a date certaine (fixed date) when it has met the formal
requirements of registration. After these formalities have been complied with, the parties to
the deed cannot by mutual consent change the date. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 356 (5th
ed. 1979).
149. The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

150.
151.
152.

§ 33(2) (1981).

15 Bankr. 616 (D. Nev. 1981).
Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 95 to 128 and accompanying text.

1055

E. Inferences of Intent to Allow Some Terminations
1. Not Allowing the Debtor to Reject Executory Contracts is
Analogous to Allowing the Creditor to Terminate.-In In re Petur
U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc.,'1 58 the debtor sought authorization for
rejecting an executory contract, though rejection would ruin his
creditor's business. The Washington bankruptcy court concluded
that
[b]ased upon legal and equitable considerations, the court will
not authorize the rejection of an executory contract by the trustee if such rejection will result in the financial ruin of nondebtor, whose entire business depends upon the executory contract . . . .We are dealing with the actual ruination of an othand ongoing business. Equity will
erwise profitable, successful
15 4
not permit such a result.
Even when rejection of the contract is in the best interest of the
debtor and the general creditors of the estate, the court will not allow rejection that ruins the creditor's business.
A rule that requires the complete destruction of the creditor's
business in order to prevent the debtor's rejection can lead to harsh
results. The rule applies only to very narrow fact situations, as when
the debtor induces a small company to exert the majority of its efforts for the debtor's business. 155 This creates an implied representation that the debtor will remain solvent for the life of the executory
contract. The creditor's theory for denial of the debtor's rejection,
then, is akin to promissory estoppel.'" e The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in In re Chi-Feng
Huang 57 articulated a standard more palatable to creditors. The
court reasoned that it could not properly authorize "rejection of a
lease or executory contract where the party whose contract is to be
rejected would be damaged disproportionately to any benefit to be
derived by the general creditors of the estate."' 5 8
The same equitable considerations that lead courts to invalidate
the debtor's rejection of executory contracts should allow a creditor
to terminate an executory contract, if the contract provides for the
right to terminate when enforcement of the contract would damage
that creditor disproportionately to any benefit derived by the debtor
or general creditors of the estate.
153. 35 Bankr. 561 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
154. Id. at 564.
155. For example, where creditor's entire business is to produce a component part for
debtor's unique product, a rejection of the contract would ruin creditor's business.
156. See generally, A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 193-209 (1952).
157. 23 Bankr. 798 (9th Cir. 1982).
158. Id. at 801.
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2. Expiration of Non-Residential Real Property Leases: Section 541(b).' 59-According to the new section 541(b), the bankruptcy estate will no longer include the debtor's interest in a nonresidential real property lease. Disposition of a lease that would
terminate post-petition by its own terms, upon notice served pre-petition, would depend entirely on the contract. The new law prohibits
debtor from assuming and assigning its rights under the lease agreement even for the time required for the period of notice to lapse. For
example, in Nashville White Trucks, the debtor filed a petition for
relief on January 10, having received notice that the contract would
terminate on January 29. The interim filing did not create rights in
the debtor. Section 541(b) seems to evidence a Congressional intent
that other executory contracts 6 ' which expire post-petition by their
own terms, including the option to terminate upon notice, should not
become property of the estate. VI. Avoiding the Anomalies: Suggestions for the Creditor's Attorney1 6'
1. Termination Based on Bankruptcy
Courts will not enforce terminations motivated by debtor's
bankruptcy. In the case of an ipso facto termination-on-bankruptcy
clause, section 365(e)(1) expressly prohibits enforcement of termination. 162 The creditor cannot evade this rule by not referring to bankruptcy in the contract. Proceeding under section 105(a)'s broad equitable power,' 63 a bankruptcy court will properly disallow termination
which it deems a mere retaliation against the debtor's filing a petition in bankruptcy.
The creditor's attorney simply should not include ipso facto
clauses in executory contracts. These clauses cannot possibly benefit
the creditor and their inclusion might harm the client. A court could
view the presence of a patently unenforceable forfeiture provision in
159. Under this section, property of the estate does not include:
(I) any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity
other than the debtor; or(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease
of nonresidential real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated
term of such lease before the commencement of the case under this title, and
ceases to include any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of
such lease during the case.
II U.S.C. § 541(b) (1984).
160. Section 541(b) would seem applicable by analogy to the law of termination of license agreements, because courts have generally applied the same rules and logic to terminations of leases and licenses. See supra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
161. The suggestions in this section are intended to aid the "innocent" creditor. Thus
they are designed to preserve the rights of the creditor under the Code, rather than to provide
the creditor with ways of getting around the Code.
162. See supra note 17.
163. See Advisory Information and Management Systems, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,
No. 3-83-0972, slip. op. (M.D. Tenn. June 20, 1984).
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a contract as evidence of bad faith on the part of the party who
drafted it. In addition, a court may consider the attorney who continues to include ipso facto clauses or fails to delete them from standard form contracts negligent for his failure to discover a law enacted in 1978.
2.

Incurable Defaults

Section 365(b)(1)(C) provides that the trustee may not assume
a contract or lease unless he provides adequate assurances of future
performance under such contract or lease."' The Code leaves to the
imagination of the drafter the infinite number of ways in which to
make the assurance of future performance impossible. Obviously, the
trustee cannot adequately assure performance of a unique personal
services contract. In addition, a trustee may not want to assume a
contract upon which the creditor has managed to place numerous
burdensome conditions precedent. Recognizing that negotiation of a
non-assumable contract might require the creditor to concede too
many other material terms, the creditor could draft a contract that
renders assumption so burdensome that assumption would not likely
occur.
3. Non-Ipso Facto Post-Petition Termination upon Pre-Petition Notice: Winning the Race

The Florida bankruptcy court held in In re L.J.P., Inc. that section 365(e)(1) applies only after the commencement of a bankruptcy
case. 165 The court concluded that pre-petition termination based
solely on bankruptcy was enforceable. In view of L.J.P. the creditor's
attorney should consider the following termination provision:
Licensor may terminate this agreement upon thirty days written
notice to licensee. Licensee must inform licensor of its intention
to file a petition in bankruptcy at least five days prior to filing
such a petition. Debtor's filing without conforming to this requirement shall be deemed a material, pre-petition incurable
164. See supra note 81.
165. The Florida bankruptcy court noted that,
Itlhere is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code which prohibits the termination

before bankruptcy of a contract on account of insolvency. Section 365(e)(I) ex-

pressly prohibits the termination or modification of any contract "at anytime
after the commencement of the case" solely on account of insolvency. That subsection also prohibits termination or modification of any contract solely because
of the commencement of a bankruptcy case. The express provisions of that subsection convince me that there is no legislative intent to invalidate the pre-petition termination of a contract on the sole ground of insolvency.
Similarly, there is no provision of the Code which permits assumption or the
curing of defaults in a contract terminated before bankruptcy.

L.J.P., 22 Bankr. at 558.
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breach.

If the debtor complies, the creditor will have five days to serve notice
of termination. When the debtor receives the notice, his subsequent
filing of a petition in bankruptcy will not prevent the contract from
terminating by its own terms thirty days after the receipt of notice.
Based on L.J.P., the Florida bankruptcy court would uphold this
provision. Even though creditor discriminates against debtor on the
sole ground of insolvency, that discrimination occurs pre-petition.
4.
Terms

Termination of an Executory Contract by Any of its Own

Courts create an anomaly when they allow termination of executory contracts in accordance with their own terms, based on established expiration dates or expired notices of termination, but then
proscribe termination in accordance with other terms of the contract.1 66 To remedy this situation, the creditor's attorney might employ the following provision to persuade a court that termination of a
contract pursuant to a bargained-for right to terminate upon notice
is no less significant than termination on a date certain:
Creditor may terminate this contract upon thirty days written
notice to debtor. The parties deem this termination provision to
be a material term of the contract. Accordingly, it is stipulated
that the exercising of this right to terminate shall constitute a
termination of this contract BY ITS OWN TERMS.
If the debtor protests termination, this language will require the
court to consider termination by any term of the contract. In order
to avoid termination, the court would have to draw a meaningful
distinction between termination on a date certain and the option to
terminate upon notice. Accordingly, the creditor might persuade the
court in this situation to allow termination.
5. Stopping Waiver and Estoppel
Courts sometimes invalidate termination provisions by using
waiver or estoppel. In Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp.,167 the
creditor waited seven months before seeking enforcement of a termination clause. The court considered this behavior a waiver of the
right to terminate within a reasonable time. To avoid this problem,
the contract drafter should stipulate the period of time allowed
before the right to terminate lapses under the contract:
Creditor may terminate this contract if debtor defaults on
166. See supra notes 146 to 152 and accompanying text.
167. 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954).
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amounts due creditor. Creditor may enforce this right to terminate at any time within seven months of the date of default,
after which time creditor will be deemed to have waived the
right to terminate.
Furthermore, upon default, a creditor may wish to continue to
transact business with his debtor on a week-to-week cash basis. The
creditor can avoid a claim of equitable estoppel in this situation by
adding a no-oral-modifications clause:
This contract may not be modified orally. Accordingly, neither
party may rely on the representations of the other to the extent
that such representations are in conflict with the terms of this
contract. The terms of this agreement may be varied only by a
separate writing that incorporates this document by reference,
or by a formal mutual rescission of this contract and the execution of a new contract between the parties for a separate
consideration.
Pursuant to this provision, a creditor could continue to conduct business with his debtor without promising expressly or impliedly to obligate him to the debtor for a specified period of time.
These examples illustrate that careful drafting can preserve the
creditor's right to terminate, while allowing the honest creditor to
operate within the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code as interpreted
by the courts.
VII.

Conclusion

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in keeping with the evolution of bankruptcy law in the United States and England, represents
an effort to accommodate the needs of the debtors and creditors of
its time. The Code is an attempt to give debtors a fresh start and to
treat creditors equally. In the disposition of the debtor's executory
contracts, the Code also seeks to assure the creditor the full benefit
of his bargain. Conflicts arise when the creditor's expectation includes the right to terminate contracts, while the debtor seeks to exercise his statutory right to assume or assign such contacts. Because
of a lack of pertinent statutory language concerning non-ipso facto
termination, the courts have rendered anomalous decisions. Until
Congress clarifies its intentions, the courtroom battle between bankruptcy law and contract law will continue unabated. In preparation
for that battle, attorneys must attempt, through innovative drafting,
to keep their clients on the right side of the anomalies.
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